S&S Hup
BJ 10/17
SJ 10/19

NAVAVNSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: aK REVIEWED dw LOGGED: 12/12/15 PUNCHED: ✓ VERIFIED ✓ 18 DEC 1967

CARD 1

| RECORD IDENTIFICATION | | |

NAVAVNSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: ___ REVIEWED ___ LOGGED: ___ PUNCHED: ___ VERIFIED: ___

CARD 3

RECORD IDENTIFICATION											Aircraft Injury Summary (cont'd)																										No. Occupants All Acft. Involved
Date					Type Report	Log Line Number	Aircraft Number	"B" Injuries		"C" Injuries		"D" Injuries		"E" Injuries		"F" Injuries		"G" Injuries		Total Injuries																
Cal. Yr.	Mo.	Day						Navy	Non Navy	Navy	Non Navy	Navy	Non Navy	Navy	Non Navy	Navy	Non Navy	Navy	Non Navy	Navy	Non Navy														
01 02	03 04	05 06			07	08 09	10 11	12 13	14 15	16 17	18 19	20 21	22 23	24 25	26 27	28 29	30 31	32 33	34 35	36 37	38 39														
6 7	Φ 7	3 1			1	Φ 2	Φ 1	Φ	Φ	Φ	Φ	Φ	Φ	Φ	Φ	Φ	Φ	Φ	Φ	Φ 2	Φ Φ														

| ESCAPE SYS. DATA | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

3

NAVAVNSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: ____ REVIEWED ____ LOGGED: ____ PUNCHED: ____ VERIFIED: ____

CARD 6

RECORD IDENTIFICATION											Weather Causal Factor						Facility Causal Factor	Facility Fact. After Fact	Environ. Factor			Cause + Factor Primary							Cause + Factor 1st Possible						
Date																						Misc								Misc.						
																						Wx					Fact			Wx					Fact
																						Pers					Factor			Pers					Factor
Cal. Yr.	Mo.		Day		Type Report	Log Line Number		Aircraft Number														Mat	X Ref	COMP	Ass'y.		Sub Ass'y.			Mat	X Ref	COMP	Ass'y.		Sub Ass'y.	
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42
6	7	Ø	7	3	1	1	Ø	2	Ø	1									5	W								1					T	B							

Cause + Factor 2nd Possible								Cause + Factor 3rd Possible								Cause + Factor 4th Possible								Special Attention	Special Data and Conditions													Trans. Code	Card Number		
Misc								Misc								Misc																										
Wx					Fact			Wx					Fact			Wx					Fact																					
Pers					Factor			Pers					Factor			Pers					Factor																					
Mat	X Ref	COMP	Ass'y.		Sub Ass'y.			Mat	X Ref	COMP	Ass'y.		Sub Ass'y.			Mat	X Ref	COMP	Ass'y.		Sub Ass'y.																					
43	44	45	46	47	48	49		50	51	52	53	54	55	56		57	58	59	60	61	62	63		64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
																									L												A	Ø	6	Ø

CARD 8

								3M — Material Special Data																		Manev. Prior To Occur.	OPERATOR INCAPACITATED C.F.									
								First				Second				Third				Fourth				Fifth												
								Cross Ref.	3M HowMal Code			Cross Ref.	3M HowMal Code			Cross Ref.	3M HowMal Code			Cross Ref.	3M HowMal Code			Cross Ref.	3M HowMal Code											
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49
																												N									

																																					Trans. Code	Card Number		
50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80										
																											A	Ø	8	Ø										

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 3 OF 15

NAVAVNSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: ____ REVIEWED ____ LOGGED: ____ PUNCHED: ____ VERIFIED: ____

CARD 11

RECORD IDENTIFICATION										
Date										
Cal. Yr.		Mo.		Day		Type Report	Log Line Number		Aircraft Number	
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11
6	7	Ø	7	3	1	1	Ø	2	Ø	1

Controlling LSO's Carrier Pass Description																																						
Start								Middle							In-Close							Ramp																
Alt.	Speed	Speed Modif.	Line-Up	Line-Up Modif.	Power	Nose Position	Alt.	Speed	Speed Modif.	Line-Up	Line-Up Modif.	Power	Nose Position	Alt.	Speed	Speed Modif.	Line-Up	Line-Up Modif.	Power	Nose Position	Alt.	Speed	Speed Modif.	Line-Up	Line-Up Modif.	Power	Nose Position												
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39											

CLCPD (cont'd) TOUCH-DOWN																																						
Alt.	Speed	Speed Modif.	Line-Up	Line-Up Modif.	Power	Nose Position																																		
40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
																																					1	1	

Trans. Code	Card Number		
77	78	79	80
	1	1	

CARD 12

12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	

File or Serial Number (Pilot)																																						
50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80								
												(b) (6)							5	2	6	Ø	A	1	G	1	A	1	2										

Rank/Rate	Br. of Service	Age	Yrs. D.N.A.	Status	Position	Inj. to Indiv.	Abandon A/C	Trans. Code	Card Number		
69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
									1	2	

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 4 OF 15

5

NAVAVNSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: ____ REVIEWED ____ LOGGED: ____ PUNCHED: ____ VERIFIED: ____

CARD 13

RECORD IDENTIFICATION														Emerg. Syst. Train.		Instrument Trainer		Time All Models		Time This Model				Number of →				
Date				Type Report	Log Line Number	Aircraft Number	Pilot Factor Inv.	Service Tour	Instrument Card					Last 6 Months	Last 12 Months	Last 6 Months	Last 12 Months	Total	Last 3 Months	Total	Last 3 Months	Inst. Hours Last 3 Months	Nite Hours Last 3 Months	Total Jet or Helo Time	Total	Day	Nite	Total Day This Model
Cal. Yr.	Mo.	Day																										
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41
6	7	Φ	7	3	1	1	Φ	2	Φ	1	1	1	2			Φ	Φ	Φ	Φ	Φ	5	Φ	4	Φ	6	1	1	Φ	6			2	7	3	9	2	2		1	5

| Carrier Landings | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | File or Serial Number (Co-Pilot) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

6 HWP

NAVAVNSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: ____ REVIEWED ____ LOGGED: ____ PUNCHED: ____ VERIFIED: ____

CARD 15

RECORD IDENTIFICATION											Emerg. Syst. Train.		Instrument Trainer		Time All Models		Time This Model						Number of Carrier →					
Date					Type Report	Log Line Number	Aircraft Number				Last 6 Months	Last 12 Months	Last 6 Months	Last 12 Months	Total	Last 3 Months	Total	Last 3 Months	Inst. Hours Last 3 Months	Nite Hours Last 3 Months	Total Jet or Helo Time		Total	Day	Nite	Total Day This Model	Total Nite This Model	
Cal. Yr.	Mo.	Day																										
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29
6	7	Ø	7	3	1	1	Ø	2	Ø	1																		

| Landings | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

7

NAVAVNSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: ____ REVIEWED ____ LOGGED: ____ PUNCHED: ____ VERIFIED: ____

CARD 17

RECORD IDENTIFICATION											Equip 5						Equip 6						Equip 7						Equip 8						Equip 9					
Date					Type Report	Log Line Number	Aircraft Number				Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data		Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data		Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data		Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data		Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data	
Cal. Yr.	Mo.	Day																																						
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41
6	7	Ø	7	3	1	1	Ø	2	Ø	1	N	2					J	1					K	2					S	1					P	1				

Equip 10								Equip 11						Equip 12						Equip 13						Equip 14											
Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data			Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data	Person Sequence Number		Trans. Code	Card Number		
42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
R	8							Q	4					P	3					L	5					S	F						Ø	1	A	1	7	1

CARD 18

Equip 15						Equip 16					Equip 17					Equip 18					Equip 19					Equip 20						
Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data		
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49
Ø	1					M	8					Q	2																								

Equip 21						Equip 22					Equip 23					Equip 24								
Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data	Person Sequence Number		Trans. Code	Card Number		
50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
																									Ø	1	A	1	8	1

PERSONNEL 1 OF 2

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 7 OF 15

NAVAVNSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: ____ REVIEWED ____ LOGGED: ____ PUNCHED: ____ VERIFIED: ____

CARD 21

RECORD IDENTIFICATION											Equip 45						Equip 46						Equip 47						Equip 48									
Date					Type Report	Log Line Number	Aircraft Number				Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data	Card Code 66		ACFT DESCRIPT	MISHAP DESCRIPTOR	Topog.at Mishap
Cal. Yr.	Mo.		Day																																		
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40
6	7	Φ	7	3	1	1	Φ	2	Φ	1																											

									Egress Problems																													
Type of Egress	Eject. Info.								Prior			During			Subsequent			Type/Mod. Eject. Seat		Firing Method Seq. Eject.	Seat Position	Attitude/Manev. A/C at Exit	Altitude When Ejected	Airspeed		Weight		Alt. Chute Open	In Crash Area	Time in Water		Person Sequence Number	Trans. Code	Card Number		
									Prob	Prob	Prob	Prob	Prob	Prob	Prob	Prob	Prob																				
41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
K																																		Φ	1	A	2	1	1

CARD 22

		Vertebral Fractures				Eject. Fatal Causes																				Alerting Factors					Means of Locating			
Time in Raft						Pri.	Sec.	Injury	Combat Zone								Card Code 67		Wind Velocity in Knots		Wave Height	Wave Interval in Seconds	Visibility	Air Temperature		Water Temperature		1st Factor	2nd Factor	3rd Factor	Located Site	Survivor Left Site				
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49
								G										6	7	1	7			2	6	2			B			H		A	D		

Survival Factors		Fatals Time Lapse From:			Time Lapse Last Training				Training Factors																Person Sequence Number	Trans. Code	Card Number		
		Mishap to Site Locat.	Site Locate to Victim	Mishap to Death	Low Press. Chamber	Eject. Tower	Eject. Seat	Survival																					
50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
					B	B	B	A	B																Φ	1	A	2	2	1

PERSONNEL 1 OF 2

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 8 OF 15

NAVAVNSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: ____ REVIEWED ____ LOGGED: ____ PUNCHED: ____ VERIFIED: ____

CARD 25

RECORD IDENTIFICATION											Survivor's																														
Date						Type Report	Log Line Number		Aircraft Number		Problems				Condit.		Time Lapse Reach to Rescue	Time Lapse Mishap to Rescue Completion		Rescue Recommend		CARD CODE 73		Weight		Height		Age		Sitting Height Nearest 1/4 Inch		Trunk Height Nearest 1/4 Inch			Functional Reach Nearest 1/4 inch					
Cal. Yr.		Mo.		Day											During	After																										
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41
6	7	Ø	7	3	1	1	Ø	2	Ø	1													7	3	1	6	8	7	1	2	5	3	6	3	2	4	3	3	2	2

														Supervisory Factors				Pre-Flight Factors							Experience Trng. Factors																
Buttock Knee Nearest 1/4 Inch		Leg Length Nearest 1/4 Inch						Bideltoid Nearest 1/4 Inch			CARD CODE 74		Role of Indiv. in Cause	Inadequate Briefing	ORD/LEFT ON FLT DEY CAP	Poor Crew Coordination	Other	Faulty Flight Plan	Faulty A/C Pre-Flight	Faulty Prep. Pers. Equip.	Hurried Departure	Delayed Departure	Inadequate Wx. Analysis	Other	Inadequate Transition	LIMITED TOTAL EXPERIENCE	LIMIT RECENT EXPERIENCE	FAIL TO USE ACCEPT PROC.	Other					Person Sequence Number		Trans. Codes		Card Number			
42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80		
2	4	1	4	4	2			1	9	2	7	4																					Ø	1	A	2	5	1			

CARD 27

Design Factors									Communication Problems					Environmental Factors															CARD CODE 75		Psycho Physiological Factors										
Design of Inst/Controls	Location of Inst/Controls	Failure of Inst/Controls	COCKPIT LIGHTING	Runway Lighting	Lighting Other A/C	PERSONAL EQU INTERFERENCE	WORK SPACE IN-COMPAT. W/MAN	Other	MISINTERPRET COMM	DISRUPTED COMM	Language Barrier	Noise Interference	Other	ACCELERATION FOR IN FLIGHT	DECOMPRESS ION	Vibration	Glare	Smoke Fumes	Heat	Cold	Wind Blast	VISIBILITY RESTRICTIONS: Wx Haze Dark	Icing Win dow Fog	DUST/WIND SMOKE	WX OTHER THAN VISIBILY	Other			Food Poisoning	Motion Sickness	Other Acute Illness	OTH PRE EXIST DISEASE/DEFECT	Get "Homeitis"	Hangover	Sleep Deprivation	FATIGUE, OTHER	Missed Meals		
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49			
																											7	5				P								

Psycho Physiological Factors (cont'd)																																									
DRUGS PRESCR MEDICAL DR.	Drugs, Other	Alcohol	Visual Illusions	HALLUCATIONS	UNCONSCIOUS NESS	DISORIENTAT ION VERTIGO	Hypoxia	Hyper-Ventilation	Dysbarism	CO Poisoning	Boredom	Inattention	Channelized Attention	Distraction	PREOCCUPATIN PERS. PROB.	EXCESSIVE MOT ATION TO SUC	Over Confidence	Lack of Self-Confidence	LACK OF CONF ENCE IN EQUIP	Apprehension	Panic	Other				Person Sequence Number		Trans. Codes		Card Number		
50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80									
						P														P					Ø	1	A	2	7	1										

PERSONNEL 1 OF 2

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 9 OF 15

NAVAVNSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: ____ REVIEWED ____ LOGGED: ____ PUNCHED: ____ VERIFIED ____

CARD 29

RECORD IDENTIFICATION										
Date										
Cal. Yr.		Mo.		Day		Type Report	Leg Line Number		Aircraft Number	
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11
6	7	ϕ	7	3	1	1	ϕ	2	ϕ	1

| Other Factors To Be Considered | | | | | | | | | |

NAVAVNSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: ____ REVIEWED ____ LOGGED: ____ PUNCHED: ____ VERIFIED: ____

CARD 15

RECORD IDENTIFICATION											Emerg. Syst. Train.		Instrument Trainer		Time All Models		Time This Model						Number of Carrier →					
Date					Type Report	Log Line Number	Aircraft Number				Last 6 Months	Last 12 Months	Last 6 Months	Last 12 Months	Total	Last 3 Months	Total	Last 3 Months	Inst. Hours Last 3 Months	Nite Hours Last 3 Months	Total Jet or Helo Time		Total	Day	Nite	Total Day This Model	Total Nite This Model	
Cal. Yr.		Mo.		Day																								
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40
6	7	Ø	7	3	1	1	Ø	2	Ø	1																												

Landings																																							
This Model Day Last 30 Days		This Model Nite Last 30 Days				This Individual in Acft.		Name (Instr. Plt. in Other Acft.)																			Number of Personnel Records						Trans. Code	Card Number					
41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
																																					1	5	

CARD 16

P								File or Serial Number (All Persons)							Name													Rank/Rate	Br. of Service	Age	Yrs. Exper.	Status	Position	Inj. to Indiv.	Abandon A/C	Card Code 65				
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49		
P								[redacted]																	6	2			3	2	G	1	8	5					

Equip 1						Equip 2					Equip 3					Equip 4						Person Sequence Number		Trans. Code	Card Number		
Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data		Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data							
50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
E	2					A	1					D	C					H	Ø						Ø	2	A	1	6	

PERSONNEL 2 OF 2

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 11 OF 15

NAVAVNSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: ____ REVIEWED ____ LOGGED: ____ PUNCHED: ____ VERIFIED: ____

CARD 17

RECORD IDENTIFICATION											Equip 5						Equip 6						Equip 7						Equip 8						Equip 9					
Date						Type Report	Log Line Number	Aircraft Number			Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data		Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data		Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data		Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data		Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Existed	Special Data	
Cal. Yr.		Mo.		Day																																				
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41
6	7	0	7	3	1	1	0	2	0	1	N	2					J	1					K	2					S	1					P	1				

Equip 10								Equip 11						Equip 12						Equip 13						Equip 14											
Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data			Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data		Person Sequence Number		Trans. Code	Card Number	
42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
R	8							S	2					Q	2					Q	4					P	3						0	2	A	1	7	8

CARD 18

Equip 15						Equip 16					Equip 17					Equip 18					Equip 19					Equip 20											
Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data			
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49
L	5					S	F					0	1					m	8																		

Equip 21						Equip 22					Equip 23					Equip 24									
Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data	Person Sequence Number	Trans. Code	Card Number	
50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
																								0	2	A	1	8	8

PERSONNEL 2 OF 2

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 12 OF 15

NAVAVNSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: ____ REVIEWED ____ LOGGED: ____ PUNCHED: ____ VERIFIED: ____

CARD 21

RECORD IDENTIFICATION											Equip 45						Equip 46						Equip 47						Equip 48									
Date						Type Report	Log Line Number	Aircraft Number			Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data	Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition		Phase Existed	Special Data	Card Code 46		ACFT DESCRIPT	MISHAP DESCRIPTOR	Topog.at Mishap
Cal. Yr.		Mo.		Day																																	
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40
6	7	Ø	7	3	1	1	Ø	2	Ø	1																													

Type of Egress	Eject. Info.								Egress Problems									Type/Mod. Eject. Seat		Firing Method Seq. Eject.	Seat Position	Attitude/Maneu. A/C at Exit	Altitude When Ejected	Airspeed		Weight		Alt. Chute Open	In Crash Area	Time In Water		Person Sequence Number	Trans. Code	Card Number		
									Prior			During			Subsequent																					
									Prob	Prob	Prob	Prob	Prob	Prob	Prob	Prob	Prob																			
41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
K																																		Ø	2	A	2	1	1

CARD 22

Time in Raft		Vertebral Fractures				Eject. Fatal Causes		Injury	Combat Zone								Card Code 67		Wind Velocity in Knots		Wave Height	Wave Interval in Seconds	Visibility	Air Temperature		Water Temperature		Alerting Factors			Located Site	Survivor Left Site	Means of Locating			
						Pri.	Sec.																					1st Factor	2nd Factor	3rd Factor						
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49
								G										6	7	1	7			2	6	2			B			H		A	D		

Survival Factors		Fatals Time Lapse From:			Time Lapse Last Training				Training Factors															Person Sequence Number	Trans. Code	Card Number		
		Mishap to Site Locat.	Site Locate to Victim	Mishap to Death	Low Press. Chamber	Eject. Tower	Eject. Seat	Survival																				
50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
					E	D	D	B	B																Ø	2	A	2	2	1

PERSONNEL 2 OF 2

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 13 OF 15

NAVAVNSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: ____ REVIEWED ____ LOGGED: ____ PUNCHED: ____ VERIFIED: ____

CARD 25

RECORD IDENTIFICATION											Survivor's																														
Date											Problems				Condit.																										
Cal. Yr.		Mo.		Day		Type Report	Log Line Number		Aircraft Number						During	After	Time Lapse Reach to Rescue	Time Lapse Mishap to Rescue Completion	Rescue Recommend	CARD CODE 73		Weight		Height		Age		Sitting Height Nearest 1/4 Inch		Trunk Height Nearest 1/4 Inch		Functional Reach Nearest 1/4 Inch										
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41
6	7	Ø	7	3	1	1	Ø	2	Ø	1													7	3	1	9	8	7	5	2	3	3	6		2	5	1	3	7	

Buttock Knee Nearest 1/4 Inch			Leg Length Nearest 1/4 Inch					Bideltoid Nearest 1/4 Inch		CARD CODE 74		Role of Indiv. in Cause	Supervisory Factors				Pre-Flight Factors									Experience Trng. Factors																		
													Inadequate Briefing	ORD/LEFT ON FLT DEY CAP	Poor Crew Coordination	Other	Faulty Flight Plan	Faulty A/C Pre-Flight	Faulty Prep. Pers. Equip.	Hurried Departure	Delayed Departure	Inadequate Wx. Analysis	Other	Inadequate Transition	LIMITED TOTAL EXPERIENCE	LIMIT RECENT EXPERIENCE	FAIL TO USE ACCEPT PROC.	Other				Person Sequence Number		Trans. Codes		Card Number				
42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80		
2	6	3	4	8	2			1	9	2	7	4																					Ø	2	A	2	5	1			

CARD 27

Design Factors									Communication Problems					Environmental Factors																														
Design of Inst/Controls	Location of Inst/Controls	Failure of Inst/Controls	COCKPIT LIGHTING	Runway Lighting	Lighting Other A/C	PERSONAL EQU INTERFERENCE	WORK SPACE IN-COMPAT. W/MAN	Other	MISINTERPRET COMM	DISRUPTED COMM	Language Barrier	Noise Interference	Other	ACCELERATION FOR IN FLIGHT	DECOMPRESS ION	Vibration	Glare	Smoke Fumes	Heat	Cold	Wind Blast	VISIBILITY RESTRICTIONS: Wx Haze Dark	Icing Window Fog	DUST/WIND SMOKE	WX OTHER THAN VISIBILY	Other	CARD CODE 75		Psycho Physiological Factors: Food Poisoning	Motion Sickness	Other Acute Illness	OTH PRE EXIST DISEASE/DEFECT	Get "Homelits"	Hangover	Sleep Deprivation	FATIGUE. OTHER	Missed Meals						
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49			
																											7	5					P								

Psycho Physiological Factors (cont'd)																																										
DRUGS PRESCR MEDICAL DR.	Drugs, Other	Alcohol	Visual Illusions	HALLUCINATIONS	UNCONSCIOUS NESS	DISORIENTAT ION VERTIGO	Hypoxia	Hyper-Ventilation	Dysbarism	CO Poisoning	Boredom	Inattention	Channelized Attention	Distraction	PREOCCUPATIN PERS. PROB.	EXCESSIVE MOT ATION TO SUC	Over Confidence	Lack of Self-Confidence	LACK OF CONF ENCE IN EQUIP	Apprehension	Panic	Other			Person Sequence Number		Trans. Codes		Card Number																
50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80												
																				R					Ø	2	A	2	7	1													

PERSONNEL 2 OF 2

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 14 OF 15

15

NAVAVNSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: ____ REVIEWED ____ LOGGED: ____ PUNCHED: ____ VERIFIED ____

CARD 29

| RECORD IDENTIFICATION | | | | | | | | | | | Other Factors To Be Considered | | | | | | | | | | |

REQUEST FOR DELETION OF RECORD
OR CODING MODIFICATION FORM

FROM: Records DEPT. DATE 22 July 68

TO: (1) CODING SECT Ok - changed
(2) REC. CONT. BRANCH ✓
(3) ADPE DIV 22 JUL 1968
(4) REC. CONT. BRANCH

TRANSACTION CODES

D-Deletion of the entire MISHAP Master Record (use only cc 1-11 and code D in cc 77).

M-Modifying contents of any Master Record field. Use "ØØ" in Person Seq. No. field, if field to be modified is in the Gen. Data Sect. of the Master Record. Otherwise use Person Seq. No. for the individual for which the change is to be made. These changes must be in Person Seq. No. order.

IDENTIFICATION NO.						AIRCRAFT NUMBER	
YEAR	MONTH	DAY	TYPE REPT	LOG NUMBER			
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11
6	7	Ø	7	3	Ø	1	Ø	2	Ø	1

F4J 153790 (b) (6) [redacted]

	FIELD NAME	CARD NUMBER	CARD COL. OF FID. START ADD.	FIELD'S STARTING ADDRESS		PERSON SEQ. NUMBER		FIELD LENGTH		DATA TO BE INSERTED (LEFT JUSTIFIED)										TAPE REC DIV. NO.	TRANS. CODE
1	Pilot factor involved	13	12	Ø	6	8	8	Ø	Ø	Ø	1	1									
2																					
3																				Ø	1	M

NOTE: (1) For deletions of codes in a given field, leave the "DATA TO BE INSERTED" field blank and use "TRANS CODE" M in cc 77.

(2) Only corrections applying to personnel in one TAPE RECORD DIV. may be shown on a single CHANGE REQUEST form.

(b) (6) [redacted]

ORIGINATORS SIGNATURE

REQUEST FOR DELETION OF RECORD
OR CODING MODIFICATION FORM

FROM: Records DEPT. DATE 5/24/68

TO: (1) CODING SECT Eh
(2) REC. CONT. BRANCH 24 MAY 1968
(3) ADPE DIV PD
(4) REC. CONT. BRANCH

mog staff only

IDENTIFICATION NO.										AIRCRAFT NUMBER	
YEAR		MONTH		DAY		TYPE REP	LOG NUMBER				
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	
6	7	ϕ	7	3	1	2	ϕ	2	ϕ	1	

(b) (6) [redacted]

TRANSACTION CODES

D-Deletion of the entire MISHAP Master Record (use only cc 1-11 and code D in cc 77).

M-Modifying contents of any Master Record field. Use "ϕϕ" in Person Seq. No. field, if field to be modified is in the Gen. Data Sect. of the Master Record. Otherwise use Person Seq. No. for the individual for which the change is to be made. These changes must be in Person Seq. No. order.

	FIELD NAME	CARD NUMBER	CARD COL. OF FLD. START ADD.	FIELD'S STARTING ADDRESS		PERSON SEQ. NUMBER		FIELD LENGTH		DATA TO BE INSERTED (LEFT JUSTIFIED)										TAPE REC DIV. NO.		TRANS. CODE
1				12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29			
2				30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47			
3				48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	77
																								D

NOTE: (1) For deletions of codes in a given field, leave the "DATA TO BE INSERTED" field blank and use "TRANS CODE" M in cc 77.

(2) Only corrections applying to personnel in one TAPE RECORD DIV. may be shown on a single CHANGE REQUEST form.

note Records only
file this in
67ϕ731 1 = ϕ2

(b) (6) [redacted]
ORIGINATORS SIGNATURE

I. D. Number	1 2 Yr.	3 4 Mo.	5 6 Day	7 Typ	8 9 Log	10 Typ Brief	13 Narr	14 File	15 I. D.	69 Cl.	70 71 72 73 Orig. Use	75 76 Tot-Cds	77 78 Trans. Code
	67	Ø7	31	1	Ø2	1	N	N	N	1		Ø9	A

Common Fields to All Cards

CLASS CODE
1 - Non-Class
2 - Conf.

TYPE BRIEFS
CODES
1 - GEN. MISHAP
2 - BIO-MED
3 - SAF-SURV
4 - PSYCHO

CARD NO. CODED _____ REVIEWED _____ KEY PUNCHED _____ VERIFIED _____

CARD NO. 11 12	
01	PILOT LAUNCHED AT Ø1Ø2 FOR INITIAL NITE CARQUALS. WX
02	6-8ØØ FT OVCST 3-5 MI VIS WITH NO HORIZON. FIRST PASS
03	WAVE OFF - SECOND PASS BOLTERED - THIRD PASS 150-200
04	YDS AFT OF SHIP RT WING DROPPED TO CORRECT LINE UP.
05	EXCESSIVE SINK RATE ESTAB. LSO CALLED PWR 3 TIMES. AC
06	FT STRUCK RAMP WITH MAIN LAN GEAR BLOWING PORT TIRE A
07	ND DAMAGING TAIL HOOK. ACFT BOLTERED AND WAS RINGOED
08	TO MOFFET. EXPERIENCED DIFFICULTY ON LAN KEEPING ACFT
09	ON RWY. PILOT ERROR.
10	
11	
12	
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	

CARD NO. 11 12

Dispatch Code Sheets

Acft. Accidents Only

(Rev. 2-67)

Coded 02 Date 8-2-67

Logged BB Date 8/2

Punched [illegible] Date 04 AUG 196

	Codes / Card Columns
Record Ident. (common all cards)	67073121 2020 / 01-11
Source	5 12
Don't Count	13
Enemy Action	14
Aircraft Model	F004J 15-21
Model Code	13 22-23
Aircraft BuNo.	153790 24-29
Reporting Custodian	157 30-32
Type Duty	321 33-35
Major Command	1 36
Time of Day	40121 37-41
Accident Damage	D 42
Aircraft Damage	D 43
Accident Injury	C 44
Aircraft Injury	C 45
Hull No.	A61 46-48
Kind of Flight	49-51
Location (Name Code)	FJ1CVA61 53-59
Transaction Code	A 77
Card No.	010 78-80

Card No. 020

Total "A-U-L" Navy Injuries	01 33-34
Total "A-U-L" Non-Navy Injuries	61-62
Transaction Code	63-64
Card No.	A 77
	020 78-80

Card No. 030

Primary Accident Type	M2 62-63
Primary Phase of Operations	52C 64-66
Transaction Code	A 77
Card No.	030 78-80

Card No. 040

Type Operations	83 19-20
Contributing Causes	1 21-22
Transaction Code	A 77
Card No.	040 78-80

Card No. 060

Primary Cause	1 29
Special Data & Conditions	L 65-69
Transaction Code	A 77
Card No.	060 78-80

See reverse side

Card No. 150

	Codes		Card Columns
No. of Personnel Records	Ø	1	70-71
Transaction Code		A	77
Card No.	1 5	Ø	78-80

Card No. 160

			Card Columns
P		P	12
Pilot's Name	(b) (6) [redacted]	D	27-36
Status		A	41
Transaction Code		A	77
Card No.	1 6	Ø	78-80

NAVAL AVIATION SAFETY CENTER
NAVAL AIR STATION
NORFOLK, VIRGINIA 23511

131/ras
Ser 124
2 February 1968

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IAW OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

From: Commander, Naval Aviation Safety Center
To: Commanding Officer, Fighter Squadron ONE TWO ONE

Subj: VF-121 AAR ser 3-68A concerning F-4J BuNo 153790 accident occurring 31 July 1967, pilot (b) (6)

1. The subject report and all endorsements thereon have been revieved. Commander, Naval Aviation Safety Center concurs with the comments and recommendations of the Aircraft Accident Board as modified by subsequent endorsers.

2. The cause of this accident has been recorded at the NAVAVNSAFECEN indicating the PILOT (error in judgment and technique) as the single cause factor.

R. M. TVEDE, JR.
By direction

Copy to:
NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ (AIR 404) (2)
COMNAVAIRPAC
COMFAIRMIRAMAR
CO USS RANGER (CVA-61)
COMRCVW-12
NAVPLANTREPO ST LOUIS
COMNAVAIRTESTCEN

DEPARTMENTAL COMMENTS FOR "CLOSE OUT" LETTER ON ORIGINAL REVIEW

NOTE: 1. Negative report is required.
2. Positive comments will be in a format suitable for inclusion in the "close out" letter.
3. Attach additional sheets if more space is required.

M&M DEPT: No comments

(b) (6) [redacted] 201

INITIAL/CODE

AERO-MED DEPT:
Concur with conclusions + recommendations of AAR + endorsements 10/42.

No comments
JAA/3311

INITIAL/CODE

COMPLETION SHEET

Action to Correction to		Action Required	Completed Code/Date
3750-1			/
DIR			/
Misc. Items for Action or Correction			
To Code	From Code/Date		
	/		/
	/		/
	/		/
	/		/
	/		/
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	/		/
	/		/

Closed 9/11/67 ak

CLOSED

05 FEB 1968

UNIT VF-121

MODEL F4J

BUNO 153790

AAR REVIEW ROUTING SHEET

ADVANCE ROUTING

PRI	DEPT	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INIT.	INTER DEPT. ROUTING CODE/INIT.
	M&M		12/18	[illegible]	/ / / /
	AERO MED	10-18-67	10-24-67	[illegible]	/

DEPARTMENT REPRESENTATIVES INITIALS, FOR RECEIPT OF REPORTS:

REMARKS:

ORIGINAL ROUTING

DEADLINE DATE OUT OF NASC 11 JAN 1968 (15 calendar days)

EXTENSIONS

DEPT	DATE IN	DEPT. DEADLINE	DATE OUT	INIT.	INTER DEPT. ROUTING
A&R			1-24-68	[illegible]	/ / /

NASC ENDORSEMENT ROUTING

PRI	DEPT.	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INIT.
1	R&S	1-30-68	1-31-68	[illegible]
2	M&M		1-30-68	[illegible]
3	ADMIN			

ROUTING AFTER CLOSE OUT

DEPT.	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INIT	INTER DEPT. ROUTING
AEROMED				/ / /

NOTES: 1. No person other than those assigned to the Records Control Branch will remove any part of this document from the folder.
2. Departments will be fully responsible and accountable for documents in their custody until checked back into Records Control Branch.
3. Any Department desiring to retain this report longer than five (5) working days must notify Records Control Branch of their need for extension.

3750
80/
5989

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE
WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

25 SEP 1967

FOURTH ENDORSEMENT on VF-121 AAR ser 3-68A concerning F4J BuNo 153790 accident occurring 31 July 1967, pilot (b) (6)

From: Commander Naval Air Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet
To: Commander, U. S. Naval Aviation Safety Center

Subj: VF-121 AAR ser 3-68A

1. Forwarded, concurring with the conclusions and recommendations of the Aircraft Accident Board, as modified by the remarks contained in subsequent endorsements.

V. R. HUBLER
By direction

Copy to:
NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ
COMNAVAVNSAFECEN (2)
COMFAIRMIRAMAR
CO FITRON 121
CO USS RANGER
NAVPLANTREPO, STL
COMRCVW-12
CO NATC PAXRIVER

ORIGINAL

80
3750
Ser 935
7 SEP 1967

THIRD ENDORSEMENT on VF-121 serial 3-68A concerning F4J BuNo 153790, accident occurring 31 July 1967, pilot (b) (6)

From: Commander Fleet Air Miramar
To: Commander, Naval Aviation Safety Center
Via: Commander Naval Air Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: VF-121 Aircraft Accident Report serial 3-68A; forwarding of

1. Forwarded, concurring in the comments and recommendations of the Aircraft Accident Board, and the remarks contained in subsequent endorsements.

S. W. Vejtasa

S. W. VEJTASA

Copy to:
NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ
COMNAVAVNSAFECEN (2)
COMNAVAIRPAC
COMRCVW-12
FITRON 121
USS RANGER (CVA-61)
COMNAVAIRTESTCEN PAX RIVER
NAVPLANTREPO STL

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

ORIGINAL

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

COMRCVW-12:bd
3750
Ser 80/551
31 August 1967

SECOND ENDORSEMENT on VF-121 serial 3-68A, F4J BuNo 153790, accident occurring 31 July 1967, Pilot (b) (6)

From: Commander Readiness Attack Carrier Air Wing TWELVE
To: Commander, U. S. Naval Aviation Safety Center
Via: (1) Commander, Fleet Air Miramar
(2) Commander Naval Air Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: VF-121 Aircraft Accident Report serial 3-68A; forwarding of

1. Forwarded, concurring in the comments and recommendations of the Aircraft Accident Board, and the remarks of the first endorser.

R. E. GALLATIN

Copy to:
COMNAVAIRSYSCOM
COMNAVAVNSAFECEN (2)
COMNAVAIRPAC
COMFAIRMIRAMAR
CO, USS RANGER (CVA-61)
CO, FITRON 121
COMNAVAIRTESTCEN PAX RIVER
NAVPLANTREPO STL

ORIGINAL

VF121/RCG:gf
3750
Ser 1263
25 AUG 1967

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on VF 121, accident, serial 3-68A, concerning F4J, BuNo 153790, of 31 July 1967, Pilot: (b) (6)

From: Commanding Officer, Fighter Squadron ONE TWENTY-ONE
To: Commander, Naval Aviation Safety Center
Via: (1) Commander, Readiness Attack Carrier Air Wing TWELVE
(2) Commander, Fleet Air Miramar
(3) Commander, Naval Air Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: First Endorsement on VF 121, accident, serial 3-68A, concerning F4J, BuNo 153790, of 31 July 1967, Pilot: (b) (6)

1. Forwarded, concurring with the conclusions and recommendations of the board.

2. LTJG (b) (6) has had no previous accidents. His experience is limited as indicated in subject report, but no more limited than his contemporaries who have safely and sucessfully completed carrier qualification landings.

3. The investigation and analysis did not adequately consider the role of the RIO in this accident. After a thorough discussion of the accident with the RIO, ENS (b) (6) it became apparent that he did not understand the importance of his observing the lens during the critical close in phase of the carrier pass. ENS (b) (6) had not been adequately instructed in this matter, and while he conscientiously and competently performed an instrument scan, he provided little or no assistance to his pilot with regard to glide slope.

4. As a result of this accident additional training is being given to RIO's regarding monitering of glide slope and early detection of unsafe "in-close" trends.

5. The last safety survey was held 30 March 1967.

C. E. MYERS
Acting

Copy to:
COMNAVAVNSAFECEN (2)
COMNAVAIRSYSCOM
COMNAVAIRPAC
COMFAIRMIRAMAR
COMRCVW TWELVE
NAVPLANTREP STL
COMMANDER, NATC PAXRIV
CO, USS RANGER (CVA 61)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

SECTION A. IDENTIFICATION

1. AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT BOARD APPOINTED BY	2. SERIAL NO.	3. DTG (LOCAL) OF MISHAP	4. MODEL AIRCRAFT	5. BUREAU NUMBER
CO, FITRON 121	3-68A	310121T JULY	F4J	153790

6.	9. LOCATION OF MISHAP	10. DAMAGE
TO: Commander, Naval Aviation Safety Center	36-37N 122-38W USS RANGER (CVA-61)	CHARLIE

7.	8.	11. TIME OF DAY	12. TIME IN FLIGHT	13. FLIGHT CODE
VIA: CO, FITRON 121 COMRCVW TWELVE [redacted] COMFAIRMIRAMAR COMNAVAIRPAC		NIGHT	0+19	3A4

14. CLEARED FROM: CVA 61 TO: CVA 61

15. TYPE CLEARANCE	16. AIRSPEED	17. A/C WEIGHT
VFR LOCAL	130E	33,000

19. ELEVATION AT TIME OF MISHAP: S.L. 64' TERRAIN 0'

18. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MISHAP: AIRCRAFT HIT RAMP

20. LIST MODEL, BUNO, REPORTING CUSTODIAN AND DAMAGE CLASSIFICATION OF ANY OTHER A/C INVOLVED (Complete OPNAV Form 3750-1 for each A/C)

SECTION B. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

✓	FACTOR	✓	FACTOR	✓	FACTOR
X	1. PILOT ERROR IN TECHNIQUE/JUDGMENT		9. SERVICING PERSONNEL		17. WEATHER
	2. PILOT DEVIATION FROM NATOPS PROCEDURES		10. LANDING SIGNAL OFFICER		18. DESIGN AIRCRAFT
	3. PILOT INCORRECT OPERATION OF A/C SYSTEM		11. OTHER PERSONNEL (Specify)		19. DESIGN CREW EQUIPMENT
	4. PILOT OTHER (Specify)		12. ADMINISTRATIVE		20. DESIGN OTHER (Specify)
	5. CREW		13. FACILITIES-RUNWAY, OVERRUN TAXIWAY, FLIGHT DECK		21. ROLLING/PITCHING DECK ROUGH SEAS
	6. MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL		14. FACILITIES-NAV AIDS, LANDING AIDS (GCA, CCA, ILS, MIRROR)		22. MATERIAL FAILURE/MALFUNCTION
	7. MAINTENANCE SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL		15. FACILITIES-CATAPULT, ARRESTING GEAR (Ship or field)		23. UNDETERMINED
	8. SUPERVISORY OTHER (Specify)		16. FACILITIES OTHER (Specify)		24. OTHER (Specify)

SECTION C. PERSONNEL DATA

1. NAME (Last, first, & middle initial)	2. RANK/RATE	3. FILE/SERVICE NO.	4. DESIG. NATOR	5. BRANCH OF SERVICE	6. AGE	7. YEARS EXP. THIS MODEL	8. BILLET	9. POSITION	10. SQUAD CODE
PILOT (at controls at time of mishap) (b) (6) [redacted]	LTJG	(b) (6) [redacted]	1315	USNR	25	9mos.	PILOT	FRONT COCKPIT	GOLF
CO-PILOT (identify & submit separate page 1)									

PILOT EXPERIENCE IN HOURS

ITEM			ITEM		
11. ALL MODELS		425	17. CV LANDINGS DAY/NIGHT	ALL	22/0
				IN MODEL	15/0
12. ALL MODELS IN LAST 12 MONTHS		233	18. FCLP LANDINGS LAST 6 MONTHS DAY/NIGHT	ALL	71/134
				IN MODEL	71/134
13. ALL MODELS IN LAST 3 MONTHS		67	19. INSTRUMENT HOURS LAST 3 MONTHS ACTUAL/SIMULATED	ALL	0.4/0
				IN MODEL	0.4/0
14. ALL SERIES THIS MODEL	A/C	110	20. NIGHT HOURS LAST 3 MONTHS	ALL	27/
	OFT/CPT	NA/5		IN MODEL	27/
15. ALL SERIES THIS MODEL LAST 12 MONTHS	A/C	110	21. TOTAL HOURS IN JETS (if jet mishap) ~~HELOS (if helo mishap)~~		393
	OFT/CPT	NA/5	22. LAST PRIOR FLIGHT ALL SERIES THIS MODEL	DATE	30 July 1967
16. ALL SERIES THIS MODEL LAST 3 MONTHS	A/C	67		DURATION	0.1
	OFT/CPT	NA/0	24. TYPE INSTRUMENT CARD		STAN
23. DATE/GRADE LAST NATOPS STANDARDIZATION CHECK		NONE			

OTHER PERS

25. NAME (Last, first, & middle initial)	26. DFC	27. RANK/RATE	28. BRANCH OF SERVICE	29. FILE/SERVICE NO.	30. UNIT	31. FLIGHT	32. SEAT	33. POSITION
(b) (6) [redacted]		ENS	USNR	(b) (6) [redacted]		GOLF	RIO	REAR COCKPIT

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT
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SPECIAL MATERIAL REQUIRED in accordance with Para. 66, OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3750.6, [illegible] edition

OPNAV REPORT 3750-1

PART II MAINTENANCE, MATERIAL, AND FACILITIES DATA

A. A/C HISTORY

1. DATE OF MANUFACTURE	2. FLIGHT HRS. SINCE ACCEPTANCE	3. NO. OF PAR/OVERHAUL	4. MONTHS SINCE LAST PAR/OVERHAUL	5. FLT. HRS. SINCE LAST PAR/OVERHAUL	6. LAST PAR/OVERHAUL ACTIVITY	7. TYPE OF LAST CHECK PERFORMED	8. FLIGHT HOURS SINCE LAST CHECK	9. DAYS SINCE LAST CHECK

B. ENGINE HISTORY

	1. ENGINE MODEL	2. ENGINE SERIAL NUMBER	3. FLIGHT HRS. SINCE ACCEPTANCE	4. NUMBER OF OVERHAULS	5. WAS DIR REQUESTED?	6. FLT. HRS. SINCE LAST OVERHAUL	7. LAST OVERHAUL ACTIVITY	8. TYPE OF LAST CHECK PERFORMED	9. FLIGHT HOURS SINCE LAST CHECK	10. DAYS SINCE LAST CHECK
(1)										
(2)										
(3)										
(4)										

C. COMPONENT HISTORY

	1. COMPONENT INVOLVED NOMENCLATURE	2. MANUFACTURERS PART NUMBER	3. TOTAL HRS. ON PART	4. NO. OF OVERHAULS	5. HOURS SINCE LAST OVERHAUL	6. OVERHAUL ACTIVITY	7. WAS DIR REQUESTED?	8. SER. NO. FUR/AMPEUR
(1)								
(2)								
(3)								
(4)								

D. INCIDENTS & GROUND ACCIDENTS

1. PARTS REPAIRED		3. DIRECT MANHOURS INVOLVED	2. PARTS REPLACED	
PART NUMBER	NOMENCLATURE		PART NUMBER	NOMENCLATURE

E. ENGINE FAILURES

JET ENGINE FLAMEOUT (Include intentional securing to prevent engine damage)

	1. ALTITUDE	2. IAS	3. RPM	4. EGT	5. MANEUVER AT TIME OF FLAMEOUT	6. FUEL FLOW	7. ATTITUDE
AT TIME OF FLAMEOUT							

8. G FORCES	9. RELIGHT ☐ ATTEMPTED ☐ ACCOMPLISHED	10. ALTITUDE	11. IAS	12. MAX EGT	13. FUEL CONTROL ☐ PRIMARY ☐ MANUAL	14. NO. RELIGHT ATTEMPTS

INTENTIONAL SECURE	15. ENGINE SYMPTOMS	16. CAUSE OF SYMPTOMS

RECIPROCATING ENGINE FAILURE

17. ALTITUDE	18. IAS	19. ATTITUDE	20. RPM	21. MAP	22. TORQUE/BMEP	23. FUEL FLOW PRESSURE	24. OIL PRESSURE

INTENTIONAL SECURE	25. ENGINE SYMPTOMS	26. CAUSE OF SYMPTOMS

F. OTHER REPORT

IDENTIFY OTHER REPORTS CONCERNING THIS MISHAP

1. AMPFUR SERIAL NUMBER _____
2. DIR MESSAGE REQUEST DATE-TIME-GROUP _____ Info NAEC on DIR request. See para. 38 OPNAVINST 3750.6E
3. OTHER PRELIMINARY MSG 010821Z AUG
4. SUPPLEMENTARY MSG 012030Z AUG

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT
OPNAV FORM 3750-1A (Rev. 3-63) Page 3

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED *in accordance with Para. 66, OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3750.6, effective edition*

OPNAV REPORT 3750-1

G. SHIPS DATA

1. EQUIPMENT INVOLVED ☐ CATAPULT ☐ ARRESTING GEAR	2. PRESSURE SETTING	3. WIND OVER DECK	4. RELATIVE WIND	5. APPROACH/END SPEED
		30 KTS	000/30 KTS	130 KTS EST.

6. MARK NUMBER	7. MODEL NUMBER	8. LOCATION OF SHIP	9. LAUNCHING BRIDLE AND BRIDLE ARRESTER

10. CATAPULT/ARRESTING GEAR BULLETINS OR NOMOGRAMS USED

11. This portion shall be completed whenever (1) an aircraft accident involves arresting gear barrier and/or barricade equipment, or (2) an aircraft accident involves malfunctioning of arresting gear, barrier and/or barricade equipment. Incidents or routine damage to cables, weldings and other expendable equipment need not be reported herein.

ENGAGED	12. DECK RUNOUT (FEET)	13. RAM TRAVEL (INCHES)	14. CONTROL VALVE SETTINGS — CONSTANT PRESSURE DOME (P.S.I.)	CONSTANT PRESSURE RATIO	CONSTANT RUNOUT (WT. LBS.)	15. ACCUMULATOR PRESSURE (PSI)	16. COMMENTS (for cable failures specify no. landings and months in service)
DECK PENDANT							
DECK PENDANT							
BARRIER/ BARRICADE							

H. DEPLOYMENT

FOR ACCIDENTS ABOARD CARRIERS (complete on pilot)

1. DATE DEPLOYED CONUS	3. DAY HOURS/LANDINGS SINCE DEPLOYMENT	4. DAY HOURS/LANDING LAST 30 DAYS
NA	1.7/5	1.7/5
2. NO. DAYS OPERATING PERIOD	**6. NIGHT HOURS/LANDINGS SINCE DEPLOYMENT**	**7. NIGHT HOURS/LANDINGS LAST 30 DAYS**
2	0.3/0	0.3/0
5. INST. HOURS LOGGED SINCE DEPLOYMENT ACTUAL/SIMULATED		
0/0		

I. WEATHER

WEATHER AT SCENE OF MISHAP

1. CEILING	2. VISIBILITY	3. RELATIVE WIND DIRECTION AND VELOCITY	4. TEMPERATURE — RUNWAY — OUTSIDE AIR	5. DEW POINT	6. ALTIMETER SETTING
6-10 OVCST	10	000/30 KTS	62	58	UNK

7. OTHER WEATHER CONDITIONS *(winds aloft, icing level, sea state, density altitude, as appropriate)*

SEA STATE 330 DEGREES, FOUR SECONDS, FOUR FEET

PART III ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

PART	SECTION	ITEM	1. REMARKS

2. COPY DISTRIBUTION

2CC NAVAVNSAFECEN DIRECT (AAR)
~~400 DUNEPS DIRECT (AAR)~~
NAVAIRSYSCOM
COMNAVAIRPAC
COMFAIRMIRAMAR
COMRCVW TWELVE
NAVPLANTREPO STL
CO, USS RANGER
NATC PAX RIV

COST DAMAGE TO: 3. GOVERNMENT PROPERTY | 4. PRIVATE PROPERTY

5. DATE SUBMITTED TO CO: 21 AUG 1967

PART IV SIGNATURES OF THE BOARD

(b) (6)

[redacted] MEMBER — UNIT BILLET

[redacted] MEMBER — UNIT BILLET

* When preparing Incident and Ground Accident reports, items indicated by an asterisk in the upper right hand corner must be filled in. Other items considered appropriate should also be filled in.

PART V THE ACCIDENT

LTJG (b) (6) with the RIO, ENS (b) (6) in F4J BuNo 153790, launched from USS RANGER (CVA 61) for night carrier qualification landings at 0102T on 31 July 1967. The aircraft was under CCA control for the duration of the flight in the vicinity of the carrier. The first landing approach was too far from center line and the aircraft was waved off for poor line up (Enclosure (1), (2)). The second approach was better, but a little too high and resulted in a bolter. The third approach was started on speed, on glide slope, but to right of centerline. The pilot was correcting to the centerline and on glide slope for the majority of the approach. As the aircraft reached a point approximately 200 yards from the ship, a right turn was initiated to complete the line up correction. As the right wind dropped, the aircraft set up an excessive sink rate with a "slow" angle of attack indication (Enclosure (3)). The LSO called for power but the aircraft continued to settle. The LSO called for power twice more with the aircraft still settling. The aircraft main tires touched down on the round down approximately 20 inches short of the level flight deck.

PART VI DAMAGE TO AIRCRAFT

F4J BuNo 153790 sustained CHARLIE damage as a result of the ramp strike. Both outer wing panels were bent and buckled between OWCS 43.00 and OWCS 48.00 when the aircraft main tires contacted the round down. The port outer wing panel failed and the portion outboard of OWCS 43.00 separated from the aircraft after it became airborne. The tail hook point was sheared off. The fuselage skin on the underside of the tail structure from FS 585.00 to FS 600.00 was damaged by the tail hook shank. The keel web structure was buckled from FS 444.80 to FS 366.54. Both tires were blown and the starboard main landing gear door was damaged.

PART VII - THE INVESTIGATION AND ANALYSIS

1. Pilot Factors. The pilot, LTJG (b) (6) was very apprehensive prior to his first night catapult launch (Enclosure (1)). During the first pattern, prior to the first approach, LTJG (b) (6) forgot to check his compass. The RIO, ENS (b) (6), informed the pilot that their heading appeared erroneous while on the downwind leg (Enclosure (2)). LTJG (b) (6) checked his compass heading and synched the remote compass in the slave mode. During normal carrier deck and catapult procedures, the compass should be set on deck using the fox corpen. After launch, the pilot should check the compass controller on the slave mode, check the synch indication, and cross check the remote compass the standby compass indicators. These procedures are necessary due to the magnetic anomalies present on a carrier deck.

The first approach ended in a wave off and during the downwind turn into the bolter pattern, LTJG (b) (6) experienced vertigo (Enclosure (1)). He was able to fight off the case of vertigo by relying on his instruments. The second approach started on speed and on glide slope. The aircraft went below glide slope in the middle of the approach and ended going "over the top" at the ramp, resulting in a bolter. The third approach was started on speed, on glide slope and slightly right of centerline. LTJG (b) (6) kept the aircraft on speed and on glide slope for the majority of the approach. As the aircraft approached the centerline, a right turn was initiated to correct the aircraft heading. As LTJG (b) (6) turned to the right, he allowed the aircraft to start to settle and decelerate. At this point, approximately 150 to 200 yards from the ramp, the LSO recognized the excessive sink rate and higher than optimum angle of attack indication. The LSO called for power and the pilot's response was too late to prevent this accident.

From the human factors viewpoint, a reasonable amount of anxiety and apprehension on the part of a pilot prior to his first night catapult lanuch and night carrier arrested landing is understandable and very normal. The degree of anxiety and apprehension can not be predicted for any individual. The amount of anxiety or apprehension that will affect an individuals performance can only be determined by a perceptable change in that individuals performance.

Another human factor that may be present in this accident is the motivation of an individual to accomplish a given task while working under stress and less than ideal conditions. This motivation has been termed "get home itis" or in the case of carrier operations, "get aboard itis" and has been known to produce disasterous results. LTJG (b) (6) was making his third attempt for a landing with a fuel state of 2800 pounds. The average CCA bolter pattern requires 800 pounds of fuel with the F4. Consequently, the third approach was the last possible attempt for a landing prior to a mandatory bingo to NAS Moffett. In other words, if LTJG (b) (6) did not make a successful landing on his third attempt, he would be sent to NAS Moffett to refuel and return. There is no stigma attached to a bingo; however, most pilots will try their utmost to aviod a bingo situation.

2. Supervisory Factors. The pilot, LTJG (b) (6) had received ample training for the carrier qualification phase of the training syllabus. LTJG (b) (6) made 71 day and 134 night MLP landings at NAS Miramar and NAF El Centro in the previous three months. No dangerous or unsatisfactory tendencies were noted by the LSO's. LTJG (b) (6) performance throughout the training syllabus showed no evidence of unsafe or unsatisfactory tendencies.

LTJG (b) (6) stated that he would have been more comfortable around the ship at night if he had MLP landings at ALF San Clemente (Enclosure (1)). Normally, each replacement pilot is given some MLP landing practice at ALF San Clemente. The weather prevailing at ALF San Clemente precluded this training for the group of replacement pilots currently undergoing carrier qualification.

All criteria specified by the type commander for night carrier qualification landings were met. In particular, the following criteria were met:

a. All pilots will be day and night FCLP qualified.
b. All pilots will have two day touch and go and ten day arrested landings.
c. Weather and sea state conditions:
   (1) Ceiling - 600 feet or more.
   (2) Visibility - three miles or more.
   (3) Horizon - definite, both day and night.
   (4) Carrier Deck - Relatively steady.
d. For initial night qualification landings, one day catapult launch and one day arrested landing within the preceeding thirty-six hours.

The decision to wave off a marginal or unsatisfactory carrier landing approach rests with the controlling LSO. The board could not review the PLAT tape. However, interview of qualified witnesses, including LSO's, substantiates the controlling LSO's opinion that the decision to use wave off lights at the time the approach become unsatisfactory would not have prevented this accident. The approach rapidly changed from acceptable to unsatisfactory at a point and time that required immediate action by the pilot and LSO. The LSO acted quickly and demanded immediate addition of power from the pilot. With late response by the pilot the LSO could only demand power and hope that the aircraft would not land short.

3. Facilities. There were no facilities which influencedthe accident, favorably or unfavorably. The USS RANGER is equipped with and was utilizing white deck flood lights, centerline stobe lights, fresnel lens (4 degree glide slope), and centerline drop lights.

4. Maintenance, servicing and ground handling factors. None of these factors were involved in this accident.

5. NATOPS. There were no NATOPS procedures or requirements involved in this accident. The NATOPS manual was being complied with and this accident does not indicate a possible need for a change in the NATOPS manual.

PART VIII - CONCLUSIONS

It is concluded that:

1. Pilot error in technique and judgement was the primary cause factor in this accident.

2. The pilot's anxiety, apprehension and possibly "get aboard itis" were causal factors in this accident.

3. Supervisory factors did not contribute to this accident.

4. The prevailing weather probably contributed to the pilot's anxiety and apprehension, but was not a factor in the accident.

PART IX - RECOMMENDATIONS

No worthwhile recommendations can be made concerning this accident other than reiterating the old cliche "Don't accept a low meatball" or restating the most elementary precept of night carrier aviation "If you fly the ball and donut, you won't hit the ramp."

INDEX TO ENCLOSURES

1. Statement of the pilot, LTJG (b) (6)
2. Statement of the RIO, ENS (b) (6)
3. Statement of the controlling LSO, LCDR (b) (6)
4. Resume of the pilot's flying experience.
5. MOR

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

Statement of LTJG (b) (6) (b) (6) USNR, concerning aircraft accident involving F4J BuNo 153790 occurring 31 July 1967, Pilot: (b) (6)

It all began around 0020-0025 when we were assigned NJ 153 and were in the top four in priority for the night qual period. My first impression of the night as we rode number three elevator up to the flight deck was expressed by my heart suddenly being in my throat. I've never seen such a black night in my very little night time aboard the carrier. I couln't even see the outline of the horizon. I told myself that it was going to be a real workout, especially my first night cat, which I had thought about very much.

After a normal taxi from our turn up spot aft of the No. three elevator to behind No. 1 cat we were all ready to go. Check lists were completed. My seat was lower than normal to watch the gyro more closely on the cat shot.

We got on the cat with no trouble, I reset the gyros after strut extension, turned up, checked the gages and turned on the lights.

The cat stroke felt good and I met the nose coming up on the gyro at 10° pitc up. After what seemed 3 to 4 seconds I glanced at the altimeter which read 100 feet and was begining to climb. I climbed through the 600' pattern to 800'. We were told to continue straight ahead before given clearance by CCA to turn down-wind.

It was very black and I think having my instrument floods on dim made the outside even darker. I didn't look out at the carrier until my RIO said we seeme to be heading toward the ship down wind. A quick glance at my wet compass indicat the gyro was not synched. I quickly synched the gyro and corrected my heading.

The chatter on the radio seemed extreme but it could have been because it wa just so black (and I was quite apprehensive).

The first pass we made was started with bad line up which I attempted to correct once I could see it. Speed and altitude were on, but line up right gave me problems. I never got it lined up and we were waved off.

On turning downwind I experienced a pretty good case of vertigo so I leveled the wings on the ADI and shook it off. I was a little rougher again on the gages although I never went below 600'. I did climb as high as 800'. I had no trouble with airspeed control. We went through our landing check list again. This time we got a better start on line up and I cranked my seat up higher than on the firs pass. Line up and speed were giving me no problem but the ball was. It was sligh ly low and I brought it up and a little high. Easing the power to try to bring it down gradually, I went through center to low again with a consequent power cal from the LSO. I came on with a bunch of power and held the attitude I had. It felt like a hook skip over all the wires for a bolter (LSO said I went over the t

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

Enclosure (1)

We called "bolter" and were cleared downwind. The landing check list was repeated and I seemed smoother now on the gages. We got a good start on line up altitude and speed. This time I didn't want to fall into the hole and consequently went high, the ball being just at the top of the mirror. Paddles said "looking good; work her down easy." I sucked a little power and the ball began to come down but not enough. I pulled off more power and at the same time eased the nose over to remain on speed. This must have been inside 1/8 a mile, but I'm not sure. Then the ball really started to move down as I made a line up correction. As I rotated the nose and was adding power Paddles called "Power!!!", I added more. Then there were two more power calls. I had plenty of power on but was afraid I was going for an inflight engagement. I tried to hold a fairly steep nose-up attitude but not increase it. The meatball was red and went off the bottom.

I was just easing backward on the stick when we hit. It was a solid thump and I immediately knew what had happened although I didn't know whether any damge had been sustained. We went off the angle straight and started climbing. The aircraft felt sloppy and, for an instant, I felt it might become uncontrollable. No one said anything about damage to our plane on the radio but my first thoughts were a utility hydraulic failure. Primary came up and gave us a bingo signal to Moffett. Our state was around 2600 pounds.

I got the gear up and, at 200 KTS, the flaps came up. We continued straight ahead until 2500 feet. Mean while I looked at the telepanel and the hydraulic gages Everything was O.K., although the aircraft still felt sloppy. Gear and flaps indicated up. I forgot to raise the hook. At 2500 feet we turned to 017° and switche to departure control frequency. Accelerating from 250 to 320 KTS, the aircraft commenced severe vibrations and again, for an instant, I thought it might go uncontrolable. I backed off on the speed by pulling the nose up. At 300 KTS it quit vibrating and I informed departure we were experiencing control problems in the longitudial axis at around 320 KTS. I knew to execute the bingo profile I should be climbing at 400 KTS so I again eased the nose slightly and again at 320 we got severe vibrations. I thought our stabilator was damaged.

Departure control advised raising the hook which I did and the red hook light came on and stayed. They advised turning stab aug off, which I did, but that made things worse so I turned it back on. Departure said to report "feet dry." Meanwhile we had reached 25,000 feet and I was at idle. At this time I would estimate we were 40 miles from Moffett and coming back down. I had a hard time actually sighting Moffett although I knew its approximate location and our tacan was good. We reported "feet dry," switched to Moffett tower, and told them we were at low fuel state on a bingo profile from RANGER, and had been experiencing control problem I told them our hook was down and wouldn't come up and we would be taking the gear. They rigged the short field gear I believe, 980' from approach end of 32R.

I was high over the field after having a little problem picking it out among the lights. Fuel was at 1200 pounds and I was fast. I requested a 360° turn at the approach end to get down and on speed. I had dropped gear and flaps at about 7000' when the field was safely within reach to see how the plane flew dirty. The plane felt stable as a rock.

After our 360° turn, speed was at donut and altitude was 1800' at the long 90° posit. NJ 153 felt good all the way to touchdown on speed. I told (b) (6) to be ready to go into the gear as I popped the chute. As soon as we touched down we experienced severe vibrations again, so much so that my vision was blured. The airplane veered left and I put full rudder and stick to the right. It looked as if we were going off the left side at 105 KTS (app.). I tapped the right brake and finally the nose wheel steering. Just as I told (b) (6) we were going off the runway the plane turned right. I think the right tire blew. I reversed the rudder and stick and brake. I can't remember if I let off the nose wheel steering. The plane corrected left and just before going off the left side it stopped dead. The crash crew was there immediately. I asked for chocks but they couldn't hear. I finally shut down after we had been stopped 30 seconds or so.

Upon post flight inspection both tires were blown and very hot. The port leading edge flap was damaged. About a 2'x2'x3' chunk was missing from the port wing tip. The same area on the STBD wing tip was wrinkled. The tail hook was down with no point, and leaking hydraulic fluid.

(b) (5) [redacted]

I have been a designated naval aviator for nine months and have flown 426 hours with twenty-two arrested landings.

(b) (6) [redacted]

Statement of ENS [redacted] USNR, [redacted] RIO, concerning aircraft accident involving F4J BuNo 153790 occurring 31 July 1967, Pilot: [redacted]

My pilot, LTJG [redacted] and myself had been briefed twice on the conduct of our first night period scheduled for 0030 July 31 67. Briefings were held at 2000 by ship's company and 2230 by the VF 121 LSO's and OinC. In addition to the normal briefings LTJG [redacted] and I had reviewed between us just what we expected of each other.

When we manned our aircraft (NJ 153) at approximately 0100 the weather was reportedly 800' broken, however after becoming airborne it seemed more like 500'/ 600' overcast with 3-4 miles visibility. The first downwind heading given by the ship was 145° but I saw immediately that this heading was angling us directly at t ship and informed the pilot. During the first pattern we obtained several vector changes by CCA which proved we were experiencing compass difficulties. I asked the pilot to check all compass modes which he had already done.

We finally obtained what looked liked an accurate heading for final but the difficulties we had in the pattern resulted in very poor line up with the ship and a subsequent wave off by the LSO.

By the second pattern, it seemed that our compass problems were over. Howeve during the second pattern we were flying in the clouds a great deal and during the down-wind leg I experienced vertigo for the first and only time. The second pass was rough and we were called for power by the LSO. It resulted in a bolter.

The third and final pattern was bad from the start. The pilot climbed through 850' and, at this point, I believe, he experienced his first bout of vertigo. When we levelled down wind, I called two or three times to tell him that he was in an approximate 20° bank which he corrected for when called. The turn to fina was O.K. and we had what appeared to be a good line up and ball. In close I had just stopped looking at the ball and begun to monitor the cockpit instruments when I heard the LSO call for "Power." On the second call for power I felt the pilot go to 100% as there was a definite surge of power. There was a third call for power and almost simultaneously the shock of the ramp strike.

At first I thought he had an in flight engagement because the pilot had come on with full power which seemed to preclude a ramp strike. When we remained airborne, I knew what had happened and prepared to eject. I asked the pilot whether he had control. He answered "yes," and, although we were at an unusual attitude, I could feel him fight for control. As soon as it seemed he had control of the aircraft and had begun climbing, a very severe buffet and shaking began. I felt the pilot again fighting to control the aircraft and informed him that I would stay with him as long as he had control.

The buffeting subsided and I switched to ship's departure control and Moffett tacan. I told departure that the aircraft was damaged and barely under control. They then told us to disengage the stab aug. With the stab aug disengaged the planebegan to pitch up and wing rock. The pilot reengaged the stab aug immediatel

We were now attempting to fly the bingo profile and I switched to Moffett tower. The pilot was trying to fly the 400 knot climb schedule for our bingo when the aircraft began to buffet and shake more violently than before. I looked at the calibrated airspeed which read 320. Then I looked at the TAS which was indicating 439 knots. Immediately I told the pilot to slow it down and the buffet stopped again. At this time we were at approximately 24000' and beginning idle descent. About 42 miles from Moffett. NAS Moffett tower instructed us to use runway 32 right, and that the arresting grar located 950' from the approach end would be rigged in 3-5 minutes.

When we had Moffett in sight, the pilot told me that he was ready to drop gear and flaps. We weren't certain that the plane would fly at slow speeds so the pilot told me to eject if that were the case and that he could clean up the plane and fly it out over the water beyond Moffett and then eject.

The plane handled O.K. at donut airspeed and both of us decided to stay with the plane. At this time we were 11 miles from the field at 11000'; we made a 360° turn to lose altitude and I called Moffett to verify the fact that the gear was ready.

At touch down the plane began to vibrate badly and pull to the left side of the runway at 100 KTS but somehow the pilot managed to keep it on. The vibration continued and we almost lost control again at about 50 knots yet the pilot managed to keep it on the runway until we came to a full stop. We secured the engines and left the aircraft immediately. (b) (5) [redacted]

(b) (5) [redacted]

I have approximately 140 hours in the F4 and completed the RIO syllabus two weeks prior. I also completed the carrier qualification phase one month ago flying with LCDR (b) (6) [redacted] now in VF 114.

(b) (6) [redacted]

AUTHENTICATED:

(b) (6) [redacted]

LCDR USN

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

Statement of LCDR (b) (6) USN, Controlling LSO, concerning aircraft accident involving F4J BuNo 153790 occurring 31 July 1967, Pilot: (b) (6)

I was the controlling Landing Signal Officer during the attempted recovery and subsequent ramp strike-bolter of NJ 153 (F4J BuNo 154790) aboard USS RANGER 31 July 1967.

LTJG (b) (6) was making his third approach of the night when the accident occurred. Prior to this he had had a poor line-up/glide slope wave-off and one bolter. The start of the approach, at glide slope interception, was good in altitude and airspeed with only his line-up in need of correction. LTJG LINDLE was initially right of center line and flying back for line up the majority of the time he was on the glide slope. At a point approximately 150-200 yards aft of the ship, having reached the projected center line, he dropped his right wing to complete the line up correction and in so doing also set up an excessive sink rate with higher than the opitumum angle of attack. At this time I called first for a "little power," followed directly by "power" and "POWER" calls. The aircraft continued to settle as it approached the ramp with the pilot making no noticeable attempt to correct the situation. The aircraft impacted on the ramp just slightly left of center line with both main mounts approximately 15-24 inches short of the deck. I heard a muffled explosion which sounded like a tire blowing out. This was the only damage noted from the platform. The wave-off lights were did I call for a wave-off during this approach. In my opinion the (b) (5), (b) (6)

The Fresnel lens, with basic angle setting of 4°, was being utilized as the primary recovery aid. There was 33 knots of wind down the angle deck with a ragged overcast of 600 to 800 feet and visibility of 5 miles.

I have been designated a naval aviator since 1958 and qualified as an LSO since 1963 with 2780 flight hours and 440 carrier landings.

(b) (6)

RESUME OF PILOT's FLYING EXPERIENCE

COMMAND ATTACHED	PERIOD ASSIGNED	MODEL AIRCRAFT	FLIGHT HOURS	CV LANDINGS DAY/NIGHT	OPERATIONAL/ PROFICIENCY
VF 121	1/67 to 7/67	F4	95	15/0	Operational
		F9	20	0/0	
VT 26	10/66 to 12/66	F11	24	0/0	
VT 25	6/66 to 10/66	F9	124	3/0	
CNABATRA	6/65 to 5/66	T2	116	4/0	
		T34	33	0/0	

Last ten day carrier landings:

DATE	NUMBER
7/30/67	1
7/29/67	4
6/23/67	4
6/22/67	1

No previous night carrier landings.

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

Enclosure (4)

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT - PAGE

OPNAV FORM 3750-8 (REV. 3-63)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED - *See OPNAVINST 3750.6E for instructions.*

OPNAV REPORT 3750-7

SECTION A - IDENTIFICATION

1. FROM (Name and mailing address of activity)			2. NOR NUMBER	3. LEAVE BLANK
FITRON ONE TWO ONE, NAS MIRAMAR, CALIFORNIA, 92145			4-68	
4. TYPE OF MISHAP: [X] ACCIDENT [ ] GROUND ACCIDENT [ ] INCIDENT	5. TIME & ZONE: 0121T	6. DATE: 31 July, 1967	7. GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION: Aboard USS Ranger, CVA 61, 197°57 mi. MUQ Tacan	
8. MODEL A/C: FhJ	9. BUNO: 153790	10. NO. OF OCCUPANTS: 2	11. DAMAGE CODE: CHARLIE	12. UNIT OPERATING A/C: FITRON 121

13. INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED USE ADDITIONAL SHEETS IF REQUIRED NAME (Last, first and middle initial)	14. UNIT TO WHICH ATTACHED	15. RANK/ RATE	16. FILE/SERV. NO. DESIGNATOR	17. DUTY ASSIGNMENT ABOARD A/C	17. DUTY ASSIGNMENT AT MISHAP	18. DATE OF LAST PHYSICAL	19. PHYSICALLY QUALIFIED FOR FLIGHT	20. BRANCH OF SERVICE	21. INJURY CODE	22. DISPOSITION
A. (b) (6)	FITRON 121	LTJG	(b) (6)	E	E	1 Feb'67	YES	USNR	G	I
B. (b) (6)	FITRON 121	ENS		I	I	6 Feb'67	YES	USNR	G	I
C.										
D.										

23. CLARIFICATION OF ITEMS 13-22 WHEN NECESSARY

24. MODEL-OTHER A/C IF INVOLVED	25. BUNO	26. NO. OF OCCUPANTS	27. UNIT OPERATING A/C	28. DAMAGE CODE	29. MOR NO.

30. NARRATIVE ACCOUNT OF MISHAP *(Use additional 8 x 10½ sheets if required)*

LTJG (b) (6) with his RIO, ENS (b) (6) in FhJ BuNo 153790, launched from USS RANGER, CVA 61, for night carrier qualification landings at 0102 T on 31 July, 1967. The aircraft was under CCA control for the duration of the flight in the vicinity of the ship. The first approach was too far left of centerline and was waved off for poor lineup. The second approache was better, but a little too high resulting in a bolter. The third approach was begun on speed, on glide slope, but to right of centerline. The pilot was on glide slope but correcting to center throughout most of the approach. As the aircraft reached a point about 200 yards aft of the ramp a slight turn was initiated to make final correction to centerline. As the right wing dropped the Phantom began an excessive sink rate with a slow angle of attack light. The LSO called for "Power", but the plane continued to settle. Two more calls for "POWER!" were made in very rapid order before the aircraft main tires struck the round-down just 20 inches short of the level portion of the flight deck. NJ 153 boltered successfully, albeit there was some control difficulty in flight in excess of 300Kts., and bingoed to NAS Moffett for an attempted arrested landing. One tire probably was blown on board CVA 61, and the hook point was missing. However, the second tire blew at Moffett, and the crippled plane was brought to a stop on the runway. There were no personnel injuries.

31. PRIMARY CAUSE FACTOR ASSIGNED BY ACCIDENT BOARD

Pilot error in judgment and technique.

32. CONTRIBUTING CAUSE FACTOR ASSIGNED BY ACCIDENT BOARD

Pilot anxiety

33. POSSIBLE CAUSE FACTOR ASSIGNED BY ACCIDENT BOARD

None

34. HAVE ALL FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, & RECOMMENDATIONS BEEN MADE AVAILABLE TO THE A/C ACCIDENT BOARD? IF NO, EXPLAIN. YES [X] NO [ ]

35. REPORT PREPARATION CHECK LIST

[X] ALL PARTS OF FORM COMPLETED N/A [ ] DRAWINGS SKETCHES, PHOTOS [X] SURVIVORS NARRATIVES [ ] WITNESS STATEMENTS [X] CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS [X] REQUIRED COPIES FURNISHED

36. REPORT FILED BY (Name & signature of medical officer)	DATE	37. FORWARDED (Name & signature of appointing authority)	DATE
(b) (6) (b) (6) CDR MC USN	14 Aug.'67	(b) (6) (b) (6) CDR USN	

OP-05F

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1963—689871

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT - PAGE

OPNAV REPORT 3750-7

OPNAV FORM 3750-8A (REV. 3-63)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED. — *See OPNAVINST 3750.6E for instructions.*

SECTION B - FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO OR RELATING TO MISHAP BY PHASE OF MISHAP *(List in order in accordance with Section B of inst.)*

1. FACTORS	2. PHASE OF MISHAP (See code at right) A	E	S	R

PHASE CODE: A - ACCIDENT; E - ESCAPE/EGRESS; S - SURVIVAL; R - RESCUE

FACTOR WEIGHT: M - MAJOR; C - CONTRIBUTING; Q - QUESTIONABLE OR POSSIBLE

REMARKS

(b) (5) [redacted]

SECTION C AIR CREW DATA

1. FLIGHT TIME LAST 30 DAYS (All models)	13.6
2. FLIGHT TIME LAST 24 HOURS (All models)	.5
3. NO. FLIGHTS LAST 24 HOURS (Include present flight)	2
4. TIME AT CONTROLS THIS FLIGHT	0.7
5. TOTAL FLIGHT TIME ALL MODELS	425

FLIGHT TIME THIS MODEL	6. TOTAL	7. LAST 30	8. 60 DAYS	9. 90 DAYS
	105	14	28	25

10. NO. GROUNDINGS PAST YEAR	0
11. NO. DAYS GROUNDED PAST YEAR	0
12. DATES AND TYPES OF PRIOR MISHAPS	none
13. NO. HRS. IN A DUTY STATUS LAST 24 HRS.	3.0
14. DIRECTION FACING AT TIME OF MISHAP	forward
15. LOCATION AT TIME OF MISHAP	pilot's cockpit

SECTION D ANTHROPOMETRIC DATA (Compare with health record)



AGE	25
HEIGHT	70.5 IN.
WEIGHT	168 LB.
A. SITTING HEIGHT	36.75 IN.
B. TRUNK HEIGHT	24.75 IN.
C. FUNCTIONAL REACH	32.50 IN.
D. BUTTOCK - KNEE	24.25 IN.
E. LEG LENGTH	44.50 IN.
F. SHOULDER WIDTH (BIDELTOID)	19.50 IN.

16. **LABORATORY TESTS AND RESULTS**

SPECIMEN		TEST PERFORMED	RESULTS	SPECIMEN	TEST PERFORMED	RESULTS
BLOOD	1.			TISSUE: (CNS)		
	2.			MUSCLE		
	3.	none taken		VISCERA		
URINE				OTHER:		
G.I. CONTENT						

17. X-RAY RESULTS: none taken

NOR NO.	MODEL A/C	BUNO	IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL
4-68	F4J	153790	pilot

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (b) (6) [redacted] LTJG USNR (b) (6) [redacted]

GP-GSF

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1964—713261

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT - PAGE 2

OPNAV REPORT 3750-7

OPNAV FORM 3750-6B (REV. 3-63) SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED — See OPNAVINST 3750.6E for instructions.

SECTION E INDIVIDUAL CHRONOLOGICAL DATA

SEE PAGE 8 PARA. 10 OF INSTRUCTION
TO BE COMPLETED ON PLANE COMMANDER, PILOT, CO-PILOT, OTHER INDIVIDUAL IN CONTROL OF AIRCRAFT AT TIME OF MISHAP, AND/OR INDIVIDUAL CAUSING THE MISHAP

USE LOCAL TIME AND BRIEFLY RECORD ACTIVITY WITHIN EACH COLUMN

	TIME	48 HOURS PRIOR TO MISHAP
29 July	0001	[redacted] sleeping
	0830	phoned by SDO to report for brief in 2 hours
		full breakfast
	1030	briefed for flight to ship CVA 61
	1158	took off for ship accomplished 4 day traps stayed aboard ship 1.6 hr. total
		had substantial supper
		awaited night ops in ready room for four hours in evening
	2345	night flying prospectus cancelled
30 July	1000	arose
		hearty brunch
	1130	briefed for day ops 1330 Charlie time
	1330	took off for 0.1 hr. flight time; one touch and go followed by one trap
	1800	dinner aboard
	2000	brief for night opeartions around the ship
		unable to nap in evening owing to heat and noise in stateroom
	2200	snack in Wardroom
	2230	tried resting for one hour
	2330	specific brief for night carrier qualifications
31 July	0102	manned NJ 153 for night ops, and launched

	TIME	
ACCIDENT PHASE	0121	on third pass, after a wave off and a bolter, NJ 153 main gear struck round-down on CVA 61 just 18" short of the deck
ESCAPE PHASE		no ejection
SURVIVAL PHASE		successful bolter and bingo to NAS Moffett

TIME OF RESCUE

BOR NO.	MODEL A/C	BUNO	IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL
h-68	FhJ	153790	pilot

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL [redacted] LTJG USNR [redacted]

OP-03F

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A[illegible] ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACC[illegible]NT — PAGE 5 OPNAV REPORT 3750-7

OPNAV FORM 3750-6F (REV. 2-63) SPECIAL HANDLING RE[illegible]ED. *See OPNAV INST 3750.6E for instructions*

SECTION G — ESCAPE, PERSONAL AND SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT

LIST AND CODE IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION G OF INSTRUCTION: PHASE CODES: A-ACCIDENT/MISHAP E-ESCAPE/EGRESS PHASE S-SURVIVAL R-RESCUE PHASE

1. EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION INCLUDING SPECIFIC MODEL DESIGNATION	2. MODIFICATION	3. REQUIRED	4. AVAILABLE	5. NEED	6. USED	7. FAILED	8. REMARKS (Explain failures, loss, and/or difficulty encountered. Use additional 8x10½ plain paper if needed.)
boxer style undershorts		N					
athletic "t" shirt		N					The pilot did not eject. All articles listed were available to the pilot. E S R information is not applicable.
cotton sox		N					
boots, flying, safety, steel toe		Y					
coverall, summer, flying (tan)		Y					
torso harness assembly (MA-2)		Y					
life preserver, MK-3C		Y					
helmet, pilot's protective, APH 6		Y					visor up (colored only)
mask, face, oxygen, (A-13-A)		Y					
regulator, mask mounted, MINIREG		Y					
knife and sheath, 5" blade		Y					
D/N signal flares, MK 13, MOD 0		Y					
sea dye marker		Y					
flashlight, 90° head, MX 991/U		Y					secured with a nylon lanyard around the neck and looped through the MK 3C buckles, and clipped to the chest strap.
strobe light marker, ACR4F		Y					
MAYDAY pencil flare		Y					
kneeboard		N					
parachute harness assembly (MB ejection seat MBEU 400LPA)		Y					
kit, survival, seat pan assembly		Y					
kit, Pararaft, PK-2		Y					
Koch fittings on harness		Y					

SECTION H — NARRATIVE OF ESCAPE/EGRESS, SURVIVAL AND RESCUE PHASES

wristwatch -- no identifying inscription
wedding ring- " " "
class ring -- University of Kentucky, inscribed " (b) (6) "
wallet, containing identification card and $25 in bills

contents of pockets;
pencil
cigarettes
book matches

He was not wearing
anti-G suit (not required on this mission)
gloves (optional around the ship)
shroud cutter(required)
metal dog tag(required))

MOR NO.	MODEL A/C	BUNO	IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL
4-68	F4J	153790	pilot

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (b) (6) LTJG USNR (b) (6)

OP-05F

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1964—712966

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF [redacted] ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT — PAGE 6

OPNAV REPORT 3750-7

OPNAV FORM 3750-6G (REV. 3-63)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED. *See OPNAV INST 3750.6E for instructions*

SECTION I — DETAILS OF ESCAPE/EGRESS/SURVIVAL PHASES REFER TO SECTION I OF INSTRUCTIONS

1. TOPOGRAPHY OF INDIVIDUAL'S LANDING SITE

☐ WATER ☐ LAND ☐ OTHER No ejection

2. TYPE OF EGRESS

☐ EJECTION ☐ BAILOUT ☐ UNDERWATER ☐ NORMAL ☐ OTHER (*State type*)

S	E		REMARKS
	X	3. NOT ATTEMPTED	
		4. ATTEMPTED	
		5. ACCOMPLISHED	
		6. THRU CANOPY	
YES	NO	EGRESS DIFFICULTIES	IF YES, EXPLAIN DIFFICULTIES
		7. PRIOR TO EGRESS	
		8. DURING EGRESS	
		9. SUBSEQUENT TO EGRESS	

10. GIVE TYPE AND MODEL OF EJECTION SEAT USED

11. METHOD OF FIRING SEAT ☐ PRIMARY ☐ SECONDARY ☐ OTHER

12. SEQUENCE OF EJECTION

13. POSITION OF SEAT ON EJECTION ☐ UP ☐ DOWN ☐ FORWARD ☐ AFT ☐ OTHER

14. ATTITUDE OR MANEUVER OF A/C AT EXIT

15. AIRSPEED est 132 Kts.

16. ALTITUDE AT TIME OF EXIT (FEET) ABOVE SEA LEVEL _____ ABOVE TOPOGRAPHY _____

17. ALTITUDE OF PARACHUTE OPENING

18. WEIGHT est 203 Lbs.

19. TIME IN WATER

20. TIME IN RAFT

21. WIND VELOCITY true; 350/17 kts over deck; 30 kts

22. WAVE HEIGHT 4 feet

23. WAVE INTERVAL

24. AIR TEMPERATURE 62; dew point 58

25. WATER TEMPERATURE unknown

26. VISIBILITY aerology; 1,000 over, 10 pilots; 600 over, 4-6

27. ALERTING FACTORS

28. MEANS OF LOCATING ACCIDENT SITE

29. MEANS OF LOCATING SURVIVOR

30.

31.

32.

33.

34.

35.

36. DID INDIVIDUAL DEPART FROM LANDING SITE? (*If Yes, Explain reason and sequence up to rescue*)

☐ NO ☐ YES

SECTION J — TRAINING FACTORS

1. DATE OF LAST TRAINING

LPC 24 Jan, 1967 EJECTION TOWER 24 Jan, 1967 EJECTION SEAT 24 Jan, 1967 SURVIVAL March, 1967 Warner Springs, Calif.

2. DID THE LACK OF TRAINING AND/OR EXPERIENCE PLAY A PART IN ANY PHASE OF THIS MISHAP? (*If yes, explain*) [redacted] previous [redacted] qualification

(b) (5), (b) (6)

[redacted]

MOR NO.	MODEL A/C	BUNO	IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL
4-68	F4J	153790	pilot

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (b) (6) [redacted] LTJG USNR (b) (6) [redacted]

OF-05F

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1963-0683[illegible]

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT - PAGE

OPNAV FORM 3750-8A (REV. 3-63) — SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED. — See OPNAVINST 3750.6E for instructions. — OPNAV REPORT 3750-7

SECTION B - FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO OR RELATING TO MISHAP BY PHASE OF MISHAP (List in order in accordance with Section B of Inst.)

1. FACTORS	2. PHASE OF MISHAP (See code at right) A	E	S	R

PHASE CODE: A - ACCIDENT; E - ESCAPE/EGRESS; S - SURVIVAL; R - RESCUE

FACTOR WEIGHT: M - MAJOR; C - CONTRIBUTING; Q - QUESTIONABLE OR POSSIBLE

REMARKS

no actions or omissions by the RIO are considered contributory to this mishap

SECTION C AIR CREW DATA

1. FLIGHT TIME LAST 30 DAYS (All models)	21
2. FLIGHT TIME LAST 24 HOURS (All models)	1.7
3. NO. FLIGHTS LAST 24 HOURS (Include present flight)	2
4. TIME AT CONTROLS THIS FLIGHT	n/a
5. TOTAL FLIGHT TIME ALL MODELS	209

FLIGHT TIME THIS MODEL	6. TOTAL	7. LAST 30	8. 60 DAYS	9. 90 DAYS
	119	21	58	91

10. NO. GROUNDINGS PAST YEAR	2
11. NO. DAYS GROUNDED PAST YEAR	5
12. DATES AND TYPES OF PRIOR MISHAPS	none
13. NO. HRS. IN A DUTY STATUS LAST 24 HRS.	3
14. DIRECTION FACING AT TIME OF MISHAP	forward
15. LOCATION AT TIME OF MISHAP	RIO's cockpit

SECTION D ANTHROPOMETRIC DATA (Compare with health record)



AGE	23
HEIGHT	75.25 IN.
WEIGHT	198 LB.
A. SITTING HEIGHT	36.0 IN.
B. TRUNK HEIGHT	25.25 IN.
C. FUNCTIONAL REACH	37.0 IN.
D. BUTTOCK - KNEE	26.75 IN.
E. LEG LENGTH	18.50 IN.
F. SHOULDER WIDTH (BIDELTOID)	19.50 IN.

16. LABORATORY TESTS AND RESULTS

SPECIMEN		TEST PERFORMED	RESULTS	SPECIMEN	TEST PERFORMED	RESULTS
BLOOD	1.			TISSUE: (CNS)		
	2.			MUSCLE		
	3.	none taken		VISCERA		
URINE				OTHER:		
G.I. CONTENT						

17. X-RAY RESULTS: none taken

MOR NO.	MODEL A/C	BUNO	IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL
4-68	F4J	153790	RIO

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL: (b) (6) ENS USNR (b) (6)

OP-05F

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1964—713561

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT - PAGE 2

OPNAV REPORT 3750-7

OPNAV FORM 3750-5B (REV. 3-63) SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED — See OPNAVINST 3750.6E for instructions.

SECTION E INDIVIDUAL CHRONOLOGICAL DATA

SEE PAGE 8 PARA. 10 OF INSTRUCTION

TO BE COMPLETED ON PLANE COMMANDER, PILOT, CO-PILOT, OTHER INDIVIDUAL IN CONTROL OF AIRCRAFT AT TIME OF MISHAP, AND/OR INDIVIDUAL CAUSING THE MISHAP

USE LOCAL TIME AND BRIEFLY RECORD ACTIVITY WITHIN EACH COLUMN

	TIME	48 HOURS PRIOR TO MISHAP
29 July	0001	sleeping at home
	0845	phoned by SDO inviting him to 1030 briefing
	1030	big breakfast briefed for flight ops to ship, CVA 61
	1158	took off from NAS Miramar for CVA 61; accomplished 4 traps and remained aboard; total 1.6 hrs.
		rested in afternoon
	1800	substantial supper
		rested in evening
	2345	night operations finally cancelled out owing to weather (no flying)
30 July	1000	arose
		brunch
	1130	briefed for day touch and go landings in order to be ready for night quals.
	1330	took off for 0.1 hr, including one touch and go landing and one trap
		read until supper
	2000	briefed for night operations around the ship
	2330	specific flight brief for night quals.
		snack in wardroom
31 July	0102	manned NJ 153 for night ops, and launched

	TIME	
ACCIDENT PHASE	0121	on third pass, after a wave off and a bolter, NJ 153 main gear struck round-down on CVA 61 just 18" short of the deck
ESCAPE PHASE		no ejection
SURVIVAL PHASE		successful bolter and bingo to NAS Moffett

TIME OF RESCUE

MOR NO.	MODEL A/C	BUNO	IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL
4-68	F4J	153790	RIO

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (b) (6) ENS USNR (b) (6)

OP-05F

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1964—713560

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A[redacted]ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND AC[redacted]NT — PAGE 5 OPNAV REPORT 3750-7

OPNAV FORM 3750-6F (REV. 2-63) SPECIAL HANDLING RE[redacted]ED. *See OPNAV INST 3750.6E for instructions*

SECTION G — ESCAPE, PERSONAL AND SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT

LIST AND CODE IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION G OF INSTRUCTION: PHASE CODES: A-ACCIDENT/MISHAP S-SURVIVAL E-ESCAPE/EGRESS PHASE R-RESCUE PHASE

1. EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION INCLUDING SPECIFIC MODEL DESIGNATION	2. MODIFICATION	3. REQUIRED	4. AVAILABLE	5. NEED	6. USED	7. FAILED	8. REMARKS (Explain failures, loss, and/or difficulty encountered. Use additional 8x10½ plain paper if needed.)
boxer style undershorts		N					
athletic "t" shirt		N					
cotton sox		N					
boots, flying, safety (steel toe)		Y					
coverall, summer, flying (orange)		Y					
torso harness assembly, (MA-2)		Y					
life preserver, MK-3C		Y					
helmet, pilot's protective APH 6		Y					
mask, face, oxygen, (A-13-A)		Y					
regulator, mask mounted, MINIREG		Y					
knife and sheath, 5" blade		Y					
D/N signal flares, MK 13 MOD 0		Y					
sea-dye marker		Y					
shroud cutter (type MC-1)		Y					
flashlight, 90° head		Y					
strobe light marker ACR,LF		Y					
MAYDAY pencil flare		Y					
kneeboard		N					
parachute harness assembly (MB ejection seat MBEU 400LPA)		Y					
kit, survival, seat pan assembly		Y					
kit, sPararaft, PK-2		Y					
~~Koch fittings on torso assembly~~		Y					

SECTION H — NARRATIVE OF ESCAPE/EGRESS, SURVIVAL AND RESCUE PHASES

wristwatch -- inscribed "[redacted] from Mother 12/17/65" "O.S.U. Graduation"
wedding ring- no inscription
class ring -- class of 1965, O.S.U.

contents of pockets
wallet with $5 in bills
identification card
two wooden, and one mechanical pencils
sunglasses, prescription

RIO was wearing his prescription lenses required while flying

He was not wearing
anti-G suit (not required on this mission)
gloves (optional around the ship)
metal dog tags (required)

MOR NO.	MODEL A/C	BUNO	IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL
4-68	F4J	153790	RIO

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL [redacted] ENS USNR [redacted]

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A[redacted]CCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACC[redacted]NT — PAGE 6 OPNAV REPORT 3750-7

OPNAV FORM 3750-86 (REV. 2-63) SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED. *See OPNAV INST 3750.6E for instructions*

SECTION I DETAILS OF ESCAPE/EGRESS/SURVIVAL PHASES REFER TO SECTION I OF INSTRUCTIONS

1. TOPOGRAPHY OF INDIVIDUAL'S LANDING SITE

☐ WATER ☐ LAND ☐ OTHER No ejection

2. TYPE OF EGRESS

☐ EJECTION ☐ BAILOUT ☐ UNDERWATER ☐ NORMAL ☐ OTHER *(State type)*

S	E		REMARKS
	X	3. NOT ATTEMPTED	
		4. ATTEMPTED	
		5. ACCOMPLISHED	
		6. THRU CANOPY	
YES	NO	EGRESS DIFFICULTIES	IF YES, EXPLAIN DIFFICULTIES
		7. PRIOR TO EGRESS	
		8. DURING EGRESS	
		9. SUBSEQUENT TO EGRESS	

10. GIVE TYPE AND MODEL OF EJECTION SEAT USED

11. METHOD OF FIRING SEAT ☐ PRIMARY ☐ SECONDARY ☐ OTHER

12. SEQUENCE OF EJECTION

13. POSITION OF SEAT ON EJECTION ☐ UP ☐ DOWN ☐ FORWARD ☐ AFT ☐ OTHER

14. ATTITUDE OR MANEUVER OF A/C AT EXIT

15. AIRSPEED est 132 Kts.

16. ALTITUDE AT TIME OF EXIT (FEET) ABOVE SEA LEVEL_____ ABOVE TOPOGRAPHY_____

17. ALTITUDE OF PARACHUTE OPENING

18. WEIGHT est 233 Lbs.

19. TIME IN WATER

20. TIME IN RAFT

21. WIND VELOCITY true; 350/17 over deck; 30 Kts.

22. WAVE HEIGHT 4 feet

23. WAVE INTERVAL

24. AIR TEMPERATURE 62; dew point 58

25. WATER TEMPERATURE unknown

26. VISIBILITY aerology; 1,660 over,10 pilots; 600 over,4-6

27. ALERTING FACTORS

28. MEANS OF LOCATING ACCIDENT SITE

29. MEANS OF LOCATING SURVIVOR

30.

31.

32.

33.

34.

35.

36. DID INDIVIDUAL DEPART FROM LANDING SITE?
(If Yes, Explain reason and sequence up to rescue)

☐ NO ☐ YES

SECTION J TRAINING FACTORS

1. DATE OF LAST TRAINING

LPC 3 May, 1966 EJECTION TOWER 8 July, 1966 EJECTION SEAT 8 July, 1966 SURVIVAL Feb. 1967

2. DID THE LACK OF TRAINING AND/OR EXPERIENCE PLAY A PART IN ANY PHASE OF THIS MISHAP? *(If yes, explain)* Warner Springs, Calif.

☒ NO ☐ YES

MOR NO.	MODEL A/C	BUNO	IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL
4-68	F4J	153790	RIO

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL [redacted] ENS USNR [redacted]

GP-OSF

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1963-686329

Conclusions and recommendations on Incident 4-68, involving F4J BuNo 153790, VF[illegible] ONE TWENTY-ONE

(b) (5), (b) (6) [redacted] (b) (5)

(b) (5) [redacted]

While steaming downwind the ship was under clear skies with a horizon. However, as the aircraft were turning up CVA 61 found a 400-600 foot overcast layer and remained under it during the qualification period.

The vertigo LTJG (b) (6) experienced in the pattern and the minor compass problem, are only of questionable significance in this mishap.

This pilot had not bounced at NAF San Clemente owing to weather below minimums on two scheduled evenings. Thus, he had not had the benefit of simulating a carrier deck recovery in endless black surroundings.

No dangerous trends were seen in the three passes until seconds before the ramp strike. This writer was on the LSO platform throughout the period. LTJG (b) (6) pass deteriorated very close in, so close, in fact, that only one of the several personnel on the platform made it into the net before the aircraft had boltered past.

(b) (5), (b) (6) [redacted] (b) (5)

(b) (5) [redacted]

No other aero-medical factors germane to this mishap are identified.

The qualification periods at NAF San Clemente are highly desirable to equip neophytes for the minimum acceptable evironmental conditions for actual qualification aboard.

Several omissions of required aviation equipment are noted. These will be reviewed for all flying personnel in future briefings.

Except for inscribed rings, and, occasionally, an inscribed wristwatch, crewmembers' metal "dog tags" are the only non-inflammable means for establishing identification of victims. Even dental examination is precluded in high impact force mishaps. The wearing of "dog tags" by all flight personnel will be re-emphasized.

(b) (6) [redacted]

NNNNZCZCNASC362CZCSLB282
RTTUZYUW RUWJMUA3345 2142139-UUUU--RUCILSA.
ZNR UUUUU
R 022139Z AUG 67
FM COMNAVAIRPAC
TO RUWJAPA/FITRON ONE TWO ONE
INFO RUWJAPA/COMREADATKCARAIRWING TWELVE
RUCILSA/NAVAVNSAFECEN
BT
UNCLAS
AAR TIME EXTENSION REQUEST
A. YOUR 020131Z AUG 67
1. EXTENSION GRANTED AS REQUESTED BY REF A
BT

362/3

Corg Records

aug
022139Z

NNNYZCNASC209230
RTTUZYUW RUWJAPA0322 2132030-UUUU--RUCILSA.
ZNR UUUUU
R 012030Z AUG 67
FM FITRON ONE TWO ONE
TO RUENAAA/CNO
RUCILSA/NAVAVSAFECEN
RUWJMUA/COMNAVAIRPAC
INFO RUEDBHB/NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ
RUEDBHB/CHNAVMAT
RUWMMEA/COMTWELVE
RUCILMA/COMNAVAIRLANT
RUCILSA/CG FMFLANT
RUKHBRA/CG FMFPAC
ZEN/COMFAIRMIRAMAR
RUWMMFT/USS RANGER
ZEN/COMREADATKCARAIRWING TWELVE
RUCLAKA/COMREADATKCARAIRWING FOUR
RUCIHHA/CNAVPLANTREPO STL
RUWJABA/DAS NORTON AFB
RUWMHEA/NAS MOFFETT
BT
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PAGE TWO RUWJAPA0322 UNCLAS
SUPPLEMENTARY MSG RPT OF ACFT ACCIDENT
A. OPNAVINST 3750.6F
B. MY 0108Z1Z
1. 31 JULY 1967, 0121T, NIGHT
2. F4J, 153790, VF121, 3-68A
8. FRESNEL LENS APPROACH: ARRESTING GEAR NOT INVOLVED: APC INSTALLED BUT NOT UTILIZED: SPN-12 READING NOT AVAILABLE: PLAT TAPE AVAILABLE BUT NOT BEING FORWARDED UNLESS OTHERWISE DIRECTED: WHITE FLOODLIGHT LIGHT SETTING WERE SIXTY (60), FIFTY-FIVE (55), THIRTY-FIVE(35), AFT TO FORWARD RESPECTIVELY.
9. THE APPROACH WAS NORMAL IN ALL RESPECTS WITH THE EXCEPTION OF LINE UP TO A POINT APPROXIMATELY 300 FEET FROM THE RAMP. AT THIS TIME THE AIRCRAFT STARTED TO DECELLERATE AND THE PILOT DID NOT RESPOND TO THREE POWER CALLS. THE AIRCRAFT TOUCHED DOWN APPROXIMATELY 18 INCHES SHORT ON THE RAMP WITH BOTH MAIN GEAR, CONTINUED UP THE DECK ON A BOLTER AND WAS BINGOED TO THE DIVERT FIELD.
10. RELATIVE WIND STRAIGHT DOWN THE ANGLE AT THIRTY (30) KNOTS: WIND 350T/17

SEA STATE 330 DEGREES, FOUR (4) SECONDS, AND FOUR (4) FEET: TEMP SIXTY-TWO (62): DEW POINT FIFTY-EIGHT (58): TEN (10) MILES VISIBILITY: AEROLOGY REPORTS ONE THOUSAND FOOT OVER-CAST:PILOT REPORTS SIX HUNDRED FOOT OVERCAST.

BT

AUG
012Q307

NNNNZCZCNASC083IOP
RTTUZYUW RUWJAPA0219 2130431-UUUU--RUCILSA.
ZNR UUUUU
R 0104312 JUL 67
FM FITRON ONE TWO ONE
TO RUENAAA/CNO
RUCILSA/NAVAVSAFECEN
RUWJMUA/COMNAVAIRPAC
INFO RUEDBHB/NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ
RUEDBHB/CHNAVMAT
RUWMMEA/COMTWELVE
RUCILMA/COMNAVAIRLANT
RUCILLA/CG FMFLANT
RUWMMFA/CG FMFPAC
ZEN/COMFAIRMIRAMAR
RUWMMFT/USS RANGER
ZEN/COMREADATKCARAIRWING TWELVE
RUCLAKA/COMREADATKCARAIRWING FOUR
RUCIHHA/NAVPLANTREPO STL
RUWJABA/DAS NORTON AFB. CALIF
RUWMHEA/NAS MOFFETT
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PRELIMINARY

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PAGE TWO RUWJAPA0219 UNCLAS
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
PRELIMINARY MSG RPT OF ACFT ACCIDENT
A. OPNAVINST 3750.6F
1. 31 JULY 1967, 0121T, NIGHT
2. F4J, 153790, VF121, 3-68A
3. USS RANGER, 197/56NM NAS MOFFETT TACAN
4. (b) (6) LTJG, (b) (6) USNR, 1315, ACTIVE, GOLF
5. RIO UNINJURED
6. PORT AND STBD OUTER WING PANELS DAMAGED. TAIL HOOK BROKEN. MINOR SKIN DAMAGE TAIL SECTION. FORWARD PORT ENGINE MOUNT BROKEN, PORT CENTER LEADING EDGE BLC DUCTING DAMAGED. DELTA DAMAGE PENDING P&E
7. CARQUAL
8. NIGHT CARRIER LANDING ACCIDENT DETAILS UNKNOWN
9. RAMP STRIKE, DETAILS UNKNOWN
10. UNKNOWN
11. NONE
12. NONE
13. NA
14. NA
15. NA
16. CDR M. W. TOWNSEND, JR. CO VF121, AREA CODE 714, 271-3171
BT

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0104312

F4J 153790 VF-121 3-68A 7-31-67